UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26054
8 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3251st meeting of the Security Council, held on 8 July 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "Admission of new Members", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"The Security Council has decided to recommend to the General Assembly that the Principality of Andorra be admitted as a Member of the United Nations. On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I wish to extend my congratulations to the Principality of Andorra on this historic occasion.

"The Council notes with great satisfaction the Principality of Andorra's solemn commitment to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and to fulfil all the obligations contained therein. We look forward to the day in the near future when the Principality of Andorra will join us as a Member of the United Nations and to working closely with its representatives."

93-39177 (E) 080793

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8 July 1993

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Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 782 (1992) of 13 October 1992, 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992 and 818 (1993) of 14 April 1993,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 July 1993 (S/26034),

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the General Peace Agreement for Mozambique (S/24635) and to the timely fulfilment by all parties in good faith of obligations contained therein,

Seriously concerned that the delays in the implementation of major aspects of the General Peace Agreement have not been entirely overcome,

Encouraged by the efforts of the Government of Mozambique and the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) to maintain the cease-fire,

Noting with satisfaction the signature of the Status of Forces Agreement between the Government of Mozambique and the United Nations, and the full deployment of all the main infantry battalions of ONUMOZ,

Noting also with satisfaction the successful completion of the withdrawal of Zimbabwean and Malawian troops as provided for in the General Peace Agreement,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General dated 2 July 1993 (S/26034);

2. Pays tribute to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to the Force Commander of ONUMOZ, and to the military and civilian personnel of ONUMOZ who are tackling with determination and dedication the difficult task of helping the people of Mozambique to achieve lasting peace and democracy in their country;

3. Welcomes the progress made to date in the implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement but stresses its concern that the

delays previously reported to the Security Council have not been entirely overcome, in particular with respect to the assembly and demobilization of forces, the formation of the new unified armed forces, and finalizing the arrangements for the elections;

4. Underlines in this respect the importance it attaches to the holding of the elections no later than October 1994;

5. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to the convening of a meeting between the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the President of RENAMO in Maputo on 17 July 1993 to address major issues pertaining to the implementation of the General Peace Agreement;

6. Invites the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in their efforts to promote a resolution of these difficulties and to agree without delay to the revised timetable for the implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement on the basis of the general parameters described in paragraphs 21-23 of the report of the Secretary-General;

7. Urges the Government of Mozambique and RENAMO to begin, as a matter of urgency, the assembly and demobilization of their forces without waiting for all assembly areas to become operational;

8. Further urges RENAMO to dispatch without further delay its military personnel to the military centre in Nyanga (Zimbabwe) for training, together with military personnel of the Government of Mozambique, as the first elements of the new Mozambican Defence Force (FADM);

9. Approves the recommendation of the Secretary-General that ONUMOZ should chair the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force (CCFADM), on the strict understanding that this would not entail any obligation on the part of the United Nations for training or establishing the new armed forces, and encourages RENAMO to participate fully in the work of the Commission;

10. Stresses the importance of the early establishment of the Commission of State Administration, and the application throughout the country of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement concerning public administration;

11. Notes with appreciation the assistance and pledges made by Member States in support of the peace process, and encourages donors to provide appropriate and prompt assistance for the implementation of major aspects of the General Peace Agreement;

12. Also notes with appreciation the contribution from the Government of Italy to the Trust Fund described in paragraph 12 of the report of the Secretary-General, and welcomes the intention of a number of other Member States to contribute;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of developments regarding the full implementation of the provisions of the General Peace Agreement and to submit a report to the Security Council by

18 August 1993 on the outcome of the discussions on the revised timetable, including for the assembly and demobilization of forces and the formation of the new unified armed forces;

14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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S/26056
8 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

By resolution 843 (1993), adopted on 18 June 1993, the Security Council confirmed that its Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia was entrusted with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, and making recommendations to the President of the Security Council for appropriate action.

By a letter dated 2 July 1993 (document S/26040), the acting Chairman of the Committee transmitted the recommendations of the Committee with regard to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Uganda and Ukraine.

At consultations of the whole of the Security Council, held on 2 July 1993, it was agreed to inform you of the above-mentioned recommendations of the Committee in connection with the requests for assistance under the provision of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, and to request you to implement the actions contained in the recommendations. For this purpose, I am transmitting herewith for your information and appropriate action the text of the letter and its enclosures from the Acting Chairman of the Committee.*

(Signed) David HANNAY
President of the Security Council

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* For the letter and its enclosures, see document S/26040.

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UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26057
8 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a Statement of Acting President of the Azerbaijani Republic and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic, His Excellency Mr. Heydar Aliyev on the situation in the country and ongoing Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

080793

Annex

Statement of 2 July 1993 by Acting President of the Azerbaijani Republic and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic, H.E. Mr. Heydar Aliyev

On 24 June 1993, the powers of the President of the Azerbaijani Republic were handed over to the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic by the decision of Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijani Republic.

On behalf of the Azerbaijani Republic, I declare that there will be no changes in the internal and foreign policy of Azerbaijan. I state that Azerbaijan will continue to pursue the path of democracy, political pluralism and free economy. The Azerbaijani State will abide by human rights and all rules of international law, and the democratic reforms initiated in our republic will be stepped up and accelerated henceforth. The economic cooperation with foreign countries launched on the basis of equality and mutual benefit will continue, and obligations undertaken with regard to agreements, envisaged to be signed with some foreign companies, will be met in the framework of civilized standards. As the internal political situation in our country becomes more stable, it will be possible to deal with these matters more closely.

Following measures taken recently, the threat of civil war that would have been very dangerous for our people was eliminated, and internal political tensions decreased to some extent. However, the war waged by Armenia against the Azerbaijani Republic and military attacks launched lately against frontier districts in particular, affect the international political climate considerably.

Armenia took advantage of the crisis of the State system within the Republic, which brought about the disunity of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, and of the lack of proper control over these matters by the Azerbaijani State bodies, and carried out new attacks on Azerbaijani territories.

Since 12 June, the Armenian military forces carried out attacks in the direction of Aghdam and Aghdara, and captured the district centre of Aghdara and a number of villages. The Gadabay district that is outside the Karabakh area has been subjected to intensive military attacks, as well. As a result of the defence measures taken, these attacks have been repelled, and two or three days ago the shooting was reduced to some extent. However, on 1 July, the Armenian military forces made a heavy attack against another area of Azerbaijan - the Fuzulli and Jabrail districts. A number of our villages were captured, some of them were brutally set on fire, and there are casualties among civilians. Following the latest attacks, thousands more of our fellow countrymen, dispossessed of their property, were added to more than 500,000 refugees in Azerbaijan. Whereas the initiative of the United States, Russia and Turkey for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the United Nations Security Council resolution 822 have emerged and certain hopes to put an end to this bloody conflict have appeared, the acts of aggression by Armenia caused the sharp deterioration of the situation. I believe that the international community and all nations should resolutely condemn these acts of aggression. On behalf of Azerbaijan, I would like to reiterate that we support all efforts and decisions

made within the CSCE framework on the initiative of the United States of America, Russia and Turkey. The Azerbaijani Republic welcomes peacemaking efforts made under the leadership of the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference, Mr. M. Raffaelli, guarantees to create all conditions necessary to implement these efforts and hopes that the visit of Mr. Raffaelli to the area on 5 July will give impetus to the implementation of the initiative advanced by the group of "the Nine".

In support of the peaceful solution of the dispute, the Government of Azerbaijan calls on State leaders around the world, the United Nations, the CSCE and other authoritative international organizations to resolutely condemn the five-year long aggression of Armenia that has been recently intensified, and to take emergency, effective and drastic measures to curb the aggressor.

We also appeal to all nations and international organizations to provide humanitarian aid to the Azerbaijani Republic, badly needed in the present difficult situation.

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S/26058
8 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a Statement made by Acting President of the Azerbaijani Republic and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic, His Excellency Mr. Heydar Aliyev, during the meeting with Ambassadors of United States of America, Russian Federation and the Turkish Republic in Baku and the representative of the United Nations in Azerbaijan, which was held on 5 July 1993 in the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

080793

Annex

Statement made on 5 July 1993 by the Acting President of the Azerbaijani Republic and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijani Republic, Heydar Aliyev

In my statement of 2 July 1993, I drew the attention of the United States of America, Russia, Turkey, the United Nations, the CSCE and the international community to the situation created as a result of intensive attacks of the Armenian Armed Forces on the Azerbaijani territories and called on them to take necessary measures to stop the aggression. As these States are the initiators of the process of peaceful resolution of the Karabakh problem, the necessity of implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 822 was declared as a result of the efforts of these States.

As it was known, the Chairman of the CSCE Minsk Conference, Mr. M. Raffaelli, was to visit Azerbaijan on 5 July 1993. Leaders of the Republic, while preparing to meet Mr. M. Raffaelli, have implemented necessary measures and accepted his programme. I should note with deep regret and surprise that the Ambassadors invited here, i.e. the States they represent, have not taken necessary measures. With this statement, I refer to the fact that after 2 July, the aggression of the Armenian Armed Forces on the Azerbaijani territories not only failed to stop, but increased even more since 3-4 July.

Therefore, we do not know what policy the United States of America, Russia and Turkey are pursuing in this respect. Although we had great expectations of Mr. M. Raffaelli's visit to Azerbaijan, we hoped that Mr. M. Raffaelli's visit and the implementation of the envisaged programme would stop the attacks of the Armenian Armed Forces. Unfortunately, this morning we were informed that Mr. Raffaelli would not visit Baku and, in effect, he postponed his visit. We are not aware of the reasons of Mr. M. Raffaelli's decision.

We cannot understand why he took this step, we express our discontent and dissatisfaction with such a decision. It became known afterwards that Mr. M. Raffaelli made this decision on the basis of the information distributed by foreign agencies that the Armenians had allegedly captured Aghdam. If great political and diplomatic steps were taken on the basis of unreliable and unverified information distributed by different agencies, this merely causes our surprise and we cannot understand it. Thus, the fact that Mr. M. Raffaelli has withdrawn from his plan and postponed his envisaged visit which was of great importance, means that the CSCE, on which Azerbaijan pinned its hopes, actually keeps away from the process of the conflict and we are compelled to lead a face-to-face fight with Armenia and this deals a serious blow to the prospects for a peaceful settlement of the problem and means still greater intensification of the war in the region. It is quite impossible to put up with such a situation. In order to prevent this the United States of America, Russia and Turkey must fulfil the mission they undertook and keep their promises. The attitude shown by the Ambassadors of these States after 2 July concerning this matter can by no means satisfy us. If the great Powers undertook the initiative and repeatedly invited the Azerbaijani Government to settle the Karabakh problem by peaceful means, they must themselves meet their commitments. We request the

United Nations Security Council to intervene in this matter and to take necessary measures, making use of its capabilities and authority.

Since 2 July until the present time, a large number of our villages and settlements were captured, destroyed and burned as a result of the attacks of the Armenian Armed Forces. Many people died, many have left their homes and at present they live under severe conditions in the open air. All this undoubtedly proves that at present, it is Armenia that acts from an obviously aggressive position. We want to state that we tried to use all means to peacefully prevent the military aggression of Armenia. I personally had direct telephone talks with the leaders of the Republic of Armenia, Ambassador at large of Russia, V. Kazimirov, the Ambassadors of the United States of America and Turkey in Azerbaijan and asked them to immediately stop the aggression, invited them to solve the problem by peaceful means. Unfortunately, all this proved unsuccessful and at present the bloody fighting continues in the region of the Aghdam, Fuzuli, Jabrail districts.

We request that everybody do his duty, as appropriate, in this difficult situation. Nobody, including the representatives of foreign countries present here, should doubt that all this is the result of the aggression of the Armenian Armed Forces and it cannot be considered otherwise. We assume that in such a tragic situation these great Powers must take drastic measures.

In conclusion, we want to stress once more that we await Mr. M. Raffaelli's urgent visit, and we guarantee, on the Azerbaijani side, the fulfilment of Mr. M. Raffaelli's mission. However, this guarantee must be bilateral. If the Republic of Armenia and its forces in Nagorny Karabakh really want to settle this problem by peaceful means, they also must guarantee this. Three great Powers - the United States of America, Russia and Turkey, and the United Nations Organization must exert the necessary influence on the Republic of Armenia in order that such a guarantee be given to Mr. M. Raffaelli. We await that Mr. M. Raffaelli will come soon and begin his work.

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Security Council

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S/26059
9 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to bring to your attention the following instances of violations by Iraq of the terms of the cease-fire between the two countries.

1. On 21 February 1993, at 0900 hours, three Iraqi persons who had entered Iranian territory illegally in the vicinity of Marivan were arrested by personnel of the 28th Division of the Iranian Army.

2. On 22 February 1993, at 1430 hours, a number of armed Iraqi personnel at the geographic coordinates of 32-04 on the map of Sardasht fired at the Iranian patrol from 103rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade of 64th Division, and engaged the latter. As a result, two Iraqis were injured, three were arrested, and two sets of weapons and four rifle loaders were taken.

3. On 27 March 1993, at 1900 hours, nine Iraqi persons were disembarked from an Iraqi boat at the coast of Kani Sala village at the geographic coordinates of 84-82 on the map of Halabcheh south-east of border pillar 69/10.

4. On 6 April 1993, at 2400 hours, 90 Kalashnikov volleys were fired by anti-revolutionaries at Iranian forces at the geographic coordinates of 879-818 on the map of Halabcheh, north-east of Darvaleh Sofla village and south of Iraqi Diala Lake and Iranian Absirvan.

5. On 13 April 1993, an Iraqi armed tugboat penetrated into the Iranian territorial waters in the vicinity of Arvandrood and proceeded to confiscate an Iranian boat carrying passengers. The boat and its passengers were transported to Iraq.

6. On 15 April 1993, at 0230 hours, four armed Iraqi personnel crossed the international border and penetrated about 11 kilometres into the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the geographic coordinates of 3650-0899 on the map of the Kouhe Gotbeh, east of border pillar 24/11. Those persons who intended to penetrate into Ein Mansour sentry post were confronted by Iranian forces. They took advantage of darkness and fled back into Iraq.

7. On 17 April 1993, at 0930 hours, a transmitter antenna was installed at the geographic coordinates of 430-049 on the map of Khosravi in no man's land between the south of Khosravi city and border pillar 53/2 and Iraqi Manzarrieh sentry post.

8. On 21 April 1993, at 1800 hours, Iraqi personnel dug a trench at the geographic coordinates of 70-21 on the map of Chazzabeh in no man's land east of border pillars 15 and 16.

9. On 21 April 1993, at 2300 hours, Iraqi forces effected several explosions at the geographic coordinates of 05-68 on the map of Mehran in no man's land opposite Mohammad Ghassem sentry post in Iraq.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter was circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Permanent Representative

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S/26060
12 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General:

> "to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 15 July 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments".

2. Since the adoption of the above resolution, the Council has been periodically kept informed of developments in the Angolan situation. Previously, on 27 May 1993, I requested the President of the Security Council (S/25882) to bring to the attention of its members that I had agreed reluctantly to accede to the wish expressed by my Special Representative for Angola, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, to be released from her responsibilities. I further informed the Council of my intention, following consultations, to appoint Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, to replace Miss Anstee as my Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June 1993. In a letter (S/25883) dated 4 June 1993, the President of the Security Council informed me that members of the Council welcomed my decision and wished to express their appreciation to Miss Anstee for the courage and untiring dedication she had shown as Special Representative for Angola in especially difficult circumstances. I share these sentiments and would like to reiterate my appreciation for Miss Anstee's service to the cause of peace in Angola. As peace remains elusive in that long-suffering country, I am confident that my new Special Representative will spare no efforts in order to promote the attainment of this common objective.

I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION

3. In the six weeks since my report to the Security Council dated 25 May 1993 (S/25840), the scenario that was feared following the suspension on 21 May of the Abidjan peace talks appears, unfortunately, to have come to pass. The Angolan political and military situation has continued to deteriorate dangerously as fighting has intensified and as the mistrust which has inhibited meaningful political accommodation has deepened. The consequences, both for Angola and for regional security, are increasingly worrying. The neighbouring countries are receiving large inflows of Angolan refugees and have expressed growing concern as the fighting has spread closer to their borders. Other countries, in particular those with long-standing ties with Angola or those with nationals and property in the country, are also increasingly anxious over the worsening situation.

4. Repeated efforts by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to seize additional territory have called into serious question its declarations about peaceful intentions. The encircled provincial capital cities of Cuito/Bie, Malange and Menongue continue to hold out under government control after months of an increasingly tightening siege. UNITA has also intensified attacks on another provincial capital, Caxito, some 50 kilometres from Luanda. The seizure of the oil-producing town of Soyo and the diamond-producing town of Cafunfo is obviously aimed at causing serious economic losses to the Government. Meanwhile, the Government recently reintroduced military conscription; and the National Assembly, on 17 June 1993, adopted a resolution empowering the Government to use any means, including placing the country on a war footing, in order to confront the UNITA offensive. As the fighting has intensified throughout the national territory, so too have mutual accusations of the use of mercenaries and other foreign forces. In addition, there have been reports that both sides have entered into arrangements with foreign sources for the supply of military equipment and other support.

5. In a particularly serious incident, UNITA ambushed a train between Quipungo and Matala in Huila Province on 27 May, as a result of which up to 300 people, including women and children, died and hundreds of others were wounded. UNITA alleged that the train was ferrying troops and weapons and not civilians, as claimed. Following the attack, UNAVEM helicopters evacuated 57 seriously injured civilians, mostly women and children, from the site. I am deeply concerned about the continued fighting, which is impeding chances for peace and has aggravated an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Angola. I therefore support the statement made by the President of the Security Council to the press on 8 June 1993 in which the Council strongly condemned the 27 May train attack and urged UNITA's leaders to make sure that its forces abide by the rules of international humanitarian law.

6. The meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), convened at Cairo in June 1993, called on UNITA to resume as soon as possible the peace talks with the Government with a view to establishing a definitive cease-fire and ensuring the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola". I took the opportunity of my participation in the OAU Summit to consult extensively with President José Edouardo dos Santos and other African leaders on ways and means of advancing the peace process in Angola.

7. The United States of America, which inaugurated its Embassy in Luanda on 22 June 1993, following its recognition of the Government of Angola on 19 May, stated its willingness to continue to work with the Government and UNITA towards resuming peace talks. The South African Government has reopened its diplomatic liaison mission in Luanda, and on 4 June the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met at Windhoek for formal talks brokered by the Foreign Minister of Namibia. In addition, the President of Namibia has invited Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, to visit Namibia. The three observer countries (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States), which are continuing to play an important role in the peace process, met on 8 June 1993 in Washington and, most recently, on 8 July in Moscow. In a strongly worded statement, they called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirmed that it should be the goal of the international community to re-establish the cease-fire, complete the key aspects of the Peace Accords and implement the principles contained in the Draft Memorandum of Understanding of the Abidjan Protocol. They also agreed that the United Nations should continue its role in the search for a peaceful solution in Angola.

8. Since his arrival in Angola on 30 June, my Special Representative has been pursuing, at various levels, intensive consultations aimed at resuming the peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz". In his meeting with President dos Santos on 5 July at Luanda and with Dr. Savimbi on 8 July at Huambo, the Special Representative explored in detail various avenues to reopening the peace process. Mr. Beye reiterated my intention to recommend to the Security Council an enlarged United Nations peace-keeping presence on the condition that a comprehensive agreement was reached. Similarly, he also explored with the parties ideas contained in paragraph 38 of my previous report (S/25840) on Angola, which stressed the importance of providing adequate protection to ensure the security of humanitarian relief personnel and to guarantee that aid reached the Angolan civilian populations in need. Based on these discussions, my Special Representative reported to me on 9 July that the atmosphere might be right for some optimism for relaunching the peace negotiations.

9. In the course of the initial discussions with my new Special Representative, the Government and UNITA have expressed their readiness to resume peace talks and to facilitate humanitarian relief operations. Dr. Savimbi also stressed that he saw the need for the United Nations to assume an effective mediation role. Mr. Beye emphasized that the international community, as reflected in recent Security Council resolutions, was increasingly worried about the prevailing situation in Angola and stressed the need to preserve and consolidate the progress achieved during the recent Abidjan talks. Genuine political will and concrete action were essential in order to overcome the current impasse and to help bring the war and the suffering to an end. Only after such genuine commitment had been ascertained would new direct negotiations be useful and productive.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

10. From the outset of the renewed hostilities, the United Nations agencies and programmes did everything possible with their locally available resources to provide emergency humanitarian assistance in Angola. Almost 2 million people are now at risk and need food and non-food aid to survive. Despite logistical difficulties and security concerns, relief supplies have been delivered and distributed by the United Nations in conjunction with local and international non-governmental organizations. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in the office of the Special Representative plays a major coordinating role in this process. A United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Angola was presented at a Donors Conference in Geneva on 3 June 1993; the response, estimated at some US$ 70 million, though falling short of the appeal target of US$ 226 million, was nevertheless promising.

11. Given the absence of a cease-fire and the resulting risks encountered in the delivery of emergency relief, the Special Representative has actively pursued the one-month emergency relief plan described in paragraph 24 of my report to the Council dated 25 May 1993 (S/25840). Having secured the approval in principle of both the Government and UNITA to this plan, he informed the parties on 17 June 1993 of the starting date of its implementation. Accordingly, on 21 June, World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft flew to Saurimo, with 12 metric tonnes of food; to Luena, with 12 metric tonnes of food; and to Huambo, carrying UNICEF blankets, medicines, and 2 metric tonnes of vegetable oil from WFP. However, the whole plan was suspended after UNITA denied access to the besieged cities of Cuito/Bie, Malange and Menongue, and the Government in response decided to suspend flights temporarily pending the establishment of secure conditions to carry out flights to all destinations indicated in the United Nations plan. Since then, progress has been reported in negotiating the resumption of the plan and the Director of UCAH hopes to finalize the details during a forthcoming visit to Huambo.

12. I would like to stress once again that the effectiveness of any relief operation, especially in a situation of ongoing military confrontation, depends above all on the cooperation of the combatants. This is why I reiterate my strong appeal to the Angolans to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law and to facilitate unimpeded access for the delivery of relief to the population in need.

13. In a related development, the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, held recently at Vienna, adopted on 24 June 1993 a declaration which urged the Security Council to take steps towards reaching an immediate and effective cease-fire and restoring peace and security in Angola, and also called upon the international community to extend immediate humanitarian assistance to Angola. I should also like to express my relief that, after extensive negotiations, cooperation has been extended by UNITA to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in ensuring the long-awaited evacuation of foreign nationals who had been trapped in Huambo.

III. SITUATION OF UNAVEM II

14. In my report of 25 May 1993 (S/25840) to the Security Council, I recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. The mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Bicesse Accords. On 9 July, Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), to whose appointment the members of the Security Council agreed earlier this year (S/25343), assumed command as Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II. In this connection, I should like to pay tribute to Brigadier-General Michael Nyambuya (Zimbabwe), who has been acting as Chief Military Observer, for his distinguished service in his very difficult assignment.

15. In conformity with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 834 (1993), I have reduced the size of the Mission to its current strength of 43 international civilian staff, 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, as well as necessary local staff. The activities of the UNAVEM II military and police components, which are currently deployed in four locations in addition to Luanda, are focused on patrolling, assessing the military situation, liaising with military and civilian officials, coordinating and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and participating in other humanitarian operations. Current staff and logistic resources are based on my assessment of the situation at the time Security Council resolution 834 (1993) was adopted. However, additional administrative support will be required on short notice if there is an increase in operations. UNAVEM also continues to support UCAH at its current level of activity.

16. Vehicles and prefabricated shelters, valued at $773,000, have been recovered from several areas outside Luanda from which UNAVEM II withdrew following the outbreak of hostilities in January 1993. UNAVEM II remains at phase III security status and continues to cooperate closely on security matters with United Nations agencies operating in Angola. There are enough UNAVEM II and WFP aircraft in the country to airlift United Nations personnel in Angola to a safe haven, should that become necessary. Arrangements have also been made for a sea evacuation.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17. The international community has made a major effort to help Angola peacefully settle its civil war in the expectation that free and fair elections would provide a basis for stability, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. The establishment of UNAVEM II was coupled with a major humanitarian assistance programme to relieve the suffering of the Angolan population. The unfortunate aftermath of the election, when one party rejected its results, brought continued civil war and hardship to Angolans. Renewed hopes were placed in the Abidjan talks of April 1993. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, those talks also had to be suspended. In the present circumstances, it would, of course, be unthinkable for the international community and the United Nations to abandon Angola. At the same time, it is the Angolans themselves who can ultimately establish a firm foundation for peace through agreements and

reconciliation. Policies of capturing territories and military strategy are incompatible with these goals.

18. UNAVEM II has become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations to advance the peace process, as well as to support vital humanitarian activities in the country. To some extent, the Mission is also important as a preventive measure to check further escalation of the conflict. In addition, it has become an indispensable channel for communication between the parties. With these considerations in mind, I recommend to the Security Council that the UNAVEM II mandate be extended for a period of three months to allow the United Nations to vigorously pursue a peace agreement. My Special Representative will continue to offer his good offices, to act as intermediary between the Government and UNITA and to assist them to build on the progress made in Abidjan in order to conclude an agreement for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Angola.

19. This extension, the cost of which will be outlined in an addendum to the present report, will allow the Mission to respond to the developments in the peace process, including possible overall agreement. I very much hope that this period will be utilized for an active search for a lasting political solution, together with a strict and realistic timetable for its implementation. Once a timetable for the implementation of a peace agreement is established, I shall present specific proposals to the Security Council for the strengthening of the verification capabilities of UNAVEM II. I call on the international community to strongly encourage the parties towards the earliest return to the framework of the peace settlement based on the Bicesse Accords. Meanwhile, all avenues should be explored to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the needy in Angola. I strongly appeal to UNITA to allow the resumption without delay of the United Nations emergency humanitarian assistance plan.

20. In conclusion, I should like to pay a tribute to all UNAVEM II personnel who continue to serve with dedication to advance the peace process in Angola under difficult circumstances. My Special Representative, Mr. Beye, assisted by Major-General Garuba, have my full support in carrying out the challenging tasks ahead.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26060/Add.1
12 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council (S/26060), I indicated in paragraph 19 that the preliminary cost estimates for the interim extension of UNAVEM II would be provided in an addendum to the report.

2. Should the Security Council approve my recommendation for a three-month interim extension of UNAVEM II, it is estimated that the total cost would amount to $6,348,000 gross for the three-month period from 16 July to 15 October 1993. The current Mission strength consists of 43 international civilian staff, 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 medical and 75 local staff. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

3. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve my recommendation, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the UNAVEM special account.

Annex

Cost estimates for the extension of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for the period 16 July to 15 October 1993

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Military observers	570.2
Civilian police	185.6
Civilian personnel	2 090.8
Premises, rental and maintenance	676.4
Vehicle operations	150.0
Aircraft operations	2 233.0
Communications	100.0
Miscellaneous equipment	14.0
Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight, death and disability allowance and support costs	328.0
Total	6 348.0

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26060/Add.2
14 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

1. In response to a request conveyed to the Secretariat by the President of the Security Council in informal consultations on 13 July 1993, I wish to inform the Council that the total estimated cost of a two-month interim extension of UNAVEM II would amount to $4,307,600 for the two-month period from 16 July to 15 September 1993. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

2. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve my recommendation, that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States should be credited to the UNAVEM special account.

Annex

Cost estimates for the extension of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) for the period 16 July to 15 September 1993

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Serial		Amount
1.	Military observers	413.7
2.	Civilian police	135.7
3.	Civilian personnel	1 393.9
4.	Premises, rental and maintenance	450.9
5.	Vehicle operations	100.0
6.	Aircraft operations	1 518.7
7.	Communications	66.7
8.	Miscellaneous equipment	9.3
9.	Miscellaneous supplies, services, freight, death and disability allowance and support costs	218.7
	Total	4 307.6

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26061
9 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The attached letter, dated 6 July 1993, was addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations.

93-39341 (E) 090793 090793

110793

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Annex

[Original: French]

Letter dated 6 July 1993 from the Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your message sent on 17 June 1993 to the Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs notifying him of Security Council resolution 841 (1993) concerning the embargo against Haiti.

In this regard, I have the honour to inform you that the Swiss Federal Council has decided to associate itself with this resolution on an independent basis. Thus, it has adopted the following economic measures, which entered into force on 1 July 1993:

1. Prohibition of the export or sale of arms or any related matériel.

2. Prohibition of the export or sale of petroleum or petroleum products. For humanitarian reasons, exceptions may be granted by the Federal Office of Foreign Economic Affairs.

3. Freezing of funds and capital assets held in Switzerland by the Government or the de facto authorities of Haiti, as well as legal persons wherever they have their headquarters and wherever they carry out their activities, which are directly or indirectly controlled by the Government or the de facto authorities of Haiti. Payments from frozen accounts and transfers of frozen capital assets may be authorized on an exceptional basis, provided that such funds and capital assets are not placed, directly or indirectly, at the disposal of the Government or the de facto authorities of Haiti.

For your information, a copy of the Order of 30 June 1993* instituting the economic measures against Haiti is contained in the annex.

(Signed) Johannes J. MANZ
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Switzerland
to the United Nations

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* The text of the legislation is available for consultation in the office of the Committee secretariat, room S-3545.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26062
9 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a list showing the 1,336 miscellaneous unexploded bombs, projectiles and missiles found and disposed of in the various parts of Iraq over the period from 1 to 30 June 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex containing the above-mentioned list circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

Number of miscellaneous unexploded bombs, projectiles and missiles dealt with by disposal teams of the civil defence departments in all governorates, 1-30 June 1993

	Governorate	Number
1.	Baghdad	9
2.	Ninawa	99
3.	Basra	110
4.	Karbala	966
5.	Anbar	56
6.	Dhi Qar	61
7.	Diyala	15
8.	Maysan	9
9.	Salah al-Din	4
10.	Babil	2
11.	Najaf	2
12.	Wasit	2
13.	Muthanna	1
14.	Qadisiyah	--
15.	Ta'mim	--
	Total	1 336

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/975
S/26063
12 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Agenda item 22

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

THE SITUATION OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI

Report of the Secretary-General

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it, not later than 15 July 1993, and earlier if he considered it appropriate, on progress achieved in the efforts jointly undertaken by him and the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States (OAS) with a view to reaching a political solution to the crisis in Haiti, and bearing in mind the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolutions 47/20 A of 24 November 1992 and 47/20 B of 23 April 1993.

2. In an oral statement delivered by the Secretary-General's Senior Political Adviser to the Security Council in informal consultations on 11 June 1993, the Council was informed that, despite the efforts deployed since the middle of December 1992 by Mr. Dante Caputo, the Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and OAS, the de facto authorities in Haiti had not displayed the required political will to reach a political solution to the crisis in that country. The Secretary-General had also mentioned his belief that, in the absence of stronger pressures by the international community, the prospects for a swift and peaceful solution would be seriously in jeopardy.

3. In the days prior to the adoption of resolution 841 (1993), the Special Envoy redoubled his efforts to establish a political dialogue between the constitutional Government of Haiti and the de facto regime, bringing to the attention of the latter that, under paragraph 3 of that resolution, sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter would come into force at 00.01 EST on 23 June 1993 unless the Secretary-General, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, had reported to the Council that, in the light of the results of the negotiations conducted by the Special Envoy, the imposition of such measures was not warranted at that time.

4. While the Special Envoy was unable to establish a political dialogue, or consequently to achieve any concrete results prior to 23 June 1993, he eventually obtained the agreement of the President of Haiti and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti to participate with their respective delegations at a meeting with him at Governors Island, New York, beginning on 27 June 1993.

5. At the conclusion of that meeting, on 3 July 1993, President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and General Raoul Cédras, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, signed an Agreement containing arrangements to be made in order to resolve the Haitian crisis. The text of the Governors Island Agreement reads as follows:

> "The President of the Republic of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras, have agreed that the following arrangements should be made in order to resolve the Haitian crisis. Each of them has agreed to take, within the scope of his powers, all the necessary measures for the implementation of these arrangements. Furthermore, they both, in any case, express their support for the implementation of these arrangements and pledge to cooperate in implementing them.
>
> 1. Organization, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS), of a political dialogue between representatives of the political parties represented in the Parliament, with the participation of representatives of the Presidential Commission, in order to:
>
> (a) Agree to a political truce and promote a social pact to create the conditions necessary to ensure a peaceful transition;
>
> (b) Reach an agreement on the procedure for enabling the Haitian Parliament to resume its normal functioning;
>
> (c) Reach an agreement enabling the Parliament to confirm the Prime Minister as speedily as possible; and
>
> (d) Reach an agreement permitting the adoption of the laws necessary for ensuring the transition.
>
> 2. Nomination of a Prime Minister by the President of the Republic.
>
> 3. Confirmation of the Prime Minister by the legally reconstituted Parliament and his assumption of office in Haiti.
>
> 4. Suspension, on the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General, of the sanctions adopted under Security Council resolution 841 (1993) and suspension, on the initiative of the Secretary-General of OAS, of the other measures adopted at the OAS Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, immediately after the Prime Minister is confirmed and assumes office in Haiti.

5. Implementation, following the agreements with the constitutional Government, of international cooperation:

(a) Technical and financial assistance for development;

(b) Assistance for the administrative and judicial reform;

(c) Assistance for modernizing the Armed Forces of Haiti and establishing a new Police Force with the presence of United Nations personnel in these fields.

6. An amnesty granted by the President of the Republic within the framework of article 147 of the National Constitution and implementation of the other instruments which may be adopted by the Parliament on this question.

7. Adoption of a law establishing the new Police Force. Appointment, within this framework, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Police Force by the President of the Republic.

8. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti has decided to avail himself of his right to early retirement and the President of the Republic shall appoint a new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Haiti, who shall appoint the members of the General Staff, in accordance with the Constitution.

9. Return to Haiti of the President of the Republic, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on 30 October 1993.

10. Verification by the United Nations and the Organization of American States of fulfilment of all the foregoing commitments.

The President of the Republic and the Commander-in-Chief agree that these arrangements constitute a satisfactory solution to the Haitian crisis and the beginning of a process of national reconciliation. They pledge to cooperate fully in the peaceful transition to a stable and lasting democratic society in which all Haitians will be able to live in a climate of freedom, justice, security and respect for human rights."

6. The Agreement provides for verification of all the foregoing commitments by the United Nations and OAS. The purpose of verification will be to ensure that during the transition period all concerned comply with the letter and spirit of the Agreement, especially as regards civilian control of the military and respect for human rights.

7. It would be the intention of the Secretary-General, if these arrangements are approved, to entrust the verification of the Governors Island Agreement to the Special Envoy, who would report regularly to him and to the Secretary-General of OAS. The Secretary-General will, in turn, submit regular reports to the Security Council and the General Assembly, including such recommendations as he deems fit for action to ensure full implementation of the Agreement.

8. As regards human rights, the Secretary-General would propose that the arrangements already arrived at with the constitutional Government of Haiti and with the de facto authorities for the establishment and operation of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti of the United Nations and OAS remain in effect and continue to be fully and expeditiously implemented. The Special Envoy will include the contents of the reports addressed to him by the Executive Director of the Mission in his regular reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of OAS.

9. The representatives of the Secretary-General will consult regularly with those of the President of Haiti in order to exchange views on progress achieved in the implementation of the Agreement.

10. As regards sanctions, the Secretary-General recommends that the Security Council, after taking note of the Agreement, endorse the proposal contained in point 4 thereof that the sanctions imposed by the Council in its resolution 841 (1993) should be suspended immediately after the ratification of the Prime Minister and his assumption of his functions in Haiti. The Secretary-General further recommends that the Council decide that the suspension of the sanctions should be automatically terminated if at any time he, having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of OAS, reports to the Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any authorities in Haiti have failed to comply in good faith with the Agreement.

11. The Secretary-General would consider that failure to comply with the undertakings would include, inter alia, refusal by the High Command of the Armed Forces to obey the decisions of the new Commander-in-Chief who is to be appointed in accordance with point 8 of the Agreement, and numerous violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the international instruments to which Haiti is a party and in the Constitution of Haiti.

12. Immediately after the return of President Aristide to Haiti, the Secretary-General would report to the Security Council with a view to the sanctions being lifted definitively.

13. The Secretary-General of OAS has informed the Secretary-General that he would take parallel action with respect to the measures adopted by that Organization.

14. Point 5 of the Agreement provides for the presence of United Nations personnel in Haiti to assist in the modernization of the Armed Forces and the establishment of a new police force. After the necessary consultations with the constitutional Government of Haiti, which it is hoped will be completed in the coming days, the Secretary-General will report to the Security Council with his recommendations on that aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. He will similarly report to the General Assembly, as necessary, with his recommendations relating to the implementation of assistance for development and administrative and judicial reform.

15. The Secretary-General wishes to place on record his gratitude for the assistance he and the Special Envoy have received at all times since the beginning of this process, particularly during the negotiations at Governors Island, from the Governments of Canada, France, the United States of America and

Venezuela, which have constituted themselves as "Friends of the Secretary-General" for Haiti. Their invaluable support was crucial to the successful completion of this stage of the process.

16. The provisions of the Agreement will require detailed follow-up in the months ahead. The Secretary-General is confident that they will be fully implemented, that by 30 October of this year the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly will have been complied with and that Haiti will be firmly set on the path to a stable democratic future in which all Haitians will fully enjoy fundamental human, civil and political rights. The Secretary-General trusts that the international community will be generous and forthcoming in providing Haiti with the technical and financial assistance required for the reconstruction of its economy and its institutions, as well as moral and political support to the Haitian people in their search for a just, peaceful and prosperous society.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26064
10 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF PORTUGAL, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to send to you the English and Russian texts of the joint statement made by the Heads of the delegations of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America in Moscow, on 8 July 1993, concerning the situation in Angola, and to request that this be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Pedro CATARINO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Portugal to the
United Nations

(Signed) Yuli M. VORONTSOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
United Nations

ANNEX

[Original: English and Russian]

The representatives of Portugal, Russia and the USA, official observers for the implementation of the Bicesse Peace Accords for Angola, met in Moscow 8 July 1993. The delegations were led respectively by Mr. Jose Manuel Briosa e Gala, Secretary of State for Cooperation of Portugal, Mr. G. B. Karasin, Director of the African Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Mr. George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. The Troika participants met the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mr. A. L. Adamishin. The Troika session was addressed by Mr. V. V. Posuvalyuk, Director of the Africa and Middle East Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The observers discussed specific measures to resolve the Angolan crisis in the light of the forthcoming United Nations Security Council Meeting on Angola.

The observers analysed the current critical situation and came to the following conclusions:

- UNITA continues to pursue its military strategy to attack, capture and occupy territory and population areas administered by the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA);

- UNITA has persisted in this policy despite comprehensive efforts by the international community to re-establish a cease-fire in accordance with the Peace Accords signed by President Eduardo dos Santos, on behalf of the Government and by Dr. Jonas Savimbi, on behalf of UNITA;

- UNITA is not observing the key principles of the Peace Accords, including its pledges to respect the results of the September 1992 elections, to participate in a government of national reconciliation according to the election results, and to integrate its military forces in a unified national armed force.

The observers reiterated that it should continue to be the goal of the international community to re-establish the cease-fire, including the full observance of Triple Zero, complete the key aspects of the Bicesse Peace Accords and implement the additional principles contained in the Draft Memorandum of Understanding of the Abidjan Protocol to reinforce the Accords.

The observers call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and strongly urge UNITA to end its threats and intimidation against United Nations personnel or other participants in the peace process and refrain from direct actions or threats against citizens or installations of third countries.

Given the current circumstances the observers recognize that the GRA has the legitimate right of self-defence and view sympathetically its efforts to acquire the necessary means to defend itself. Nevertheless, the observers expressed their concern about the growing level of human suffering and destruction and stressed the consequent need to exercise restraint in order not to aggravate the situation.

The observers reiterated their strong support for previous resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and took positive note of the Cairo OFU Summit Declaration on Angola. They once again urge UNITA to implement the will of the people of Angola and of the international community and to accept a return to the framework of the peace settlement based on the Bicesse Accords and the corresponding resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. The way to a reasonable political compromise for the sake of the future of the people of Angola is open and the Government of Angola has repeatedly affirmed that.

The observers also discussed additional measures that might be considered by the United Nations Security Council to resolve the crisis in Angola, including:

- measures to limit UNITA's ability to continue its military campaign, including an arms embargo;

- measures to obtain UNITA's compliance with the Peace Accords it has signed;

- measures to restrict the international movements of UNITA members engaged in any activities contrary to the peace process;

- the reconvening of the negotiations between the GRA and UNITA under United Nations auspices as soon as possible;

- the means of assuring full compliance by UNITA of United Nations Security Council resolution 804 on the release of foreign nationals taken hostage;

- careful consideration of UNAVEM II's mandate with the possibility of bringing UNAVEM II back to its full strength;

- more effective means to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid.

The necessity of applying these or other possible measures will depend directly on the actions of UNITA's leadership.

At its meeting in Moscow the Troika also discussed the proposals concerning the expansion of economic and technical assistance to the Government of Angola from the international community for the reconstruction of the country.

The delegations of Portugal and the United States of America would like to express their gratitude to the Government of the Russian Federation for its hospitality.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26065
10 July 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace by United States aircraft for purposes of reconnaissance and provocation continued during the period 29 June to 5 July 1993.

29 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 19 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah, and Zakho.

(b) Southern region: 69 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,500 metres, centred over Nasiriyah, Basra, Amarah, Qurnah, Salman, Samawah, and Busayyah.

At 1212 hours on 29 June 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 700 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace over the Ayn Zalah area in the Ninawa Governorate. It left at 1340 hours in the direction of Turkish airspace to the north of Zakho.

30 June 1993

(a) Northern region: 35 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 52 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 11,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Busayyah, Amarah, Jalibah, and Qal'at Sukkar.

At 1350 hours on 30 June 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace over the Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah and Samawah areas. It left at 1450 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace to the south of Jalibah.

1 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Tall Afar, Zakho, Amadiyah and Dohuk.

(b) Southern region: 65 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 11,000 metres, centred over Basra, Qurnah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Shinafiyah, and Abu Sukhayr.

2 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 30 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,500 to 10,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Shaqlawah.

(b) Southern region: 73 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Salman, Samawah, Shatrah, Busayyah and Jalibah.

3 July 1993

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Zakho, and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 92 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 11,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Rifa'i, Ushbayjah, Khidr, Lasaf and Salman.

4 July 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was reported in the northern region on 4 July 1993.

(b) Southern region: At 1234 hours on 4 July 1993, a hostile two-aircraft formation flying at a speed of 780 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 7,000 metres penetrated Iraqi airspace in the southern region over Basra and Artawi. It left at 1305 hours.

5 July 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was reported in the northern region on 5 July 1993.

(b) Southern region: 61 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 12,000 metres, centred over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Salman, Amarah and Busayyah.

At 1220 hours on 5 July 1993, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres

penetrated Iraqi airspace over the Faw area in the southern region. It left at 1505 hours in the direction of Saudi airspace over the Busayyah area.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26066
8 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 JULY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached report addressed to me on 6 July 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

The report refers only to Bosnia and Herzegovina, without entering into other questions within the purview of the Conference.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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Annex

Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

INTRODUCTION

1. The activities of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia were last reported to the Security Council in document S/25709. The present report covers events concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina since early May 1993.

I. DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE VANCE-OWEN PEACE PLAN

2. It will be recalled that, up to the first week of May 1993, the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, with the support of the Security Council, had been directed towards completing signature by the three Bosnian sides of the Vance-Owen peace plan, consisting of constitutional principles, a military agreement, a provisional provincial map and an agreement on interim arrangements. Signature of the peace plan was completed on 2 May when Mr. Karadzic signed the provisional provincial map and the agreement on interim arrangements. However, Mr. Karadzic's signature was annulled almost immediately by the Bosnian-Serb assembly meeting at Pale (5 May) and the subsequent "referendum" (15 and 16 May), despite President Milosevic and Prime Minister Mitsotakis intervening in favour of it. Immediately after the assembly meeting, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) announced that it was cutting off all but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serbs.

3. One of the prerequisites for forging ahead with the implementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan in the absence of agreement by the Bosnian Serbs was the continuation of cooperation between the Muslims and Croats. Unfortunately, by the second week of May, major fighting broke out again between the Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia. The Co-Chairmen immediately left New York on 14 May in order to travel to central Bosnia for meetings with President Izetbegovic, Mr. Boban, President Tudjman and their military advisers. This meeting took place on 18 May in Medugorje, near Mostar. At the meeting, the Co-Chairmen sought to achieve the following objectives:

(a) A cessation of hostilities between the Muslims and the Croats;

(b) Cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats in the implementation of the peace plan in the six predominantly Muslim or Croat provinces;

(c) Further meetings of the Coordination Body to pursue the implementation of the peace plan;

(d) The organization of regular meetings of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(e) The formation of a Government with agreed allocations of ministries and diplomatic posts.

4. President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban reached understandings on all of these points and it was agreed to hold a follow-up meeting in Sarajevo to pursue the implementation of these decisions. On 20 May the United States and Russian Foreign Ministers met to discuss the situation in Bosnia and were joined by their United Kingdom, French and Spanish colleagues on 21 May, with a joint statement being published on 22 May. Unfortunately, the perception was conveyed during these meetings in some press reports that the roll-back of the Bosnian Serbs was no longer a priority issue on the international agenda.

5. The Co-Chairmen travelled to the follow-up meeting of the Coordination Body scheduled to be held in Sarajevo on 3 June. While there, they met Mr. Karadzic, who had welcomed the Washington statement, and his colleagues in Pale in order to see if it would be helpful to invite him to join the Coordination Body. However, they found that Mr. Karadzic had interpreted the Washington statement as meaning the Bosnian Serbs no longer had to negotiate about the Vance-Owen peace plan. He was insistent on the need for the "Republika Srpska" to be recognized, and the Co-Chairmen did not feel it appropriate to pursue the question of inviting him to designate representatives on the Coordination Body. Unfortunately, the meeting planned between President Izetbegovic and Mr. Boban in Sarajevo on 4 June could not be held. The helicopter in which Mr. Boban was flying to Sarajevo was shot at and received two direct hits, one near the fuel tank. He returned to Split. The Co-Chairmen met with President Izetbegovic and then immediately travelled to Split for discussions with Mr. Boban. The objectives of the Co-Chairmen remained the same, namely the progressive implementation of the peace plan to the extent possible in the circumstances.

6. Meanwhile fighting in central Bosnia increased between the Muslims and the Croats as each tried to contest as much territory as possible. It became increasingly evident that the cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats, which had lasted with varying degrees of commitment since the referendum in March 1992, no longer existed. The Co-Chairman visited Belgrade and Zagreb over the period 9 to 11 June. In Belgrade, President Milosevic informed them that Mr. Karadzic was ready to negotiate on the basis of the Vance-Owen peace process. In Zagreb, Mr. Boban indicated that he was willing to meet President Izetbegovic only if Mr. Karadzic also participated in the discussions. This, combined with the fighting on the ground, made it abundantly clear that a new stage had been reached in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. At the invitation of the Co-Chairmen, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina met in Geneva on 13 and 14 June. This was the first time that the full Presidency had met for nearly 14 months. The Presidency has since held several meetings in Geneva, Zagreb and Sarajevo.

8. The Co-Chairmen brought together for discussions in Geneva on 15 and 16 June Presidents Bulatovic, Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic. Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban were not present at the discussions with President Izetbegovic, but were available for consultations. President Izetbegovic listened carefully over several hours to a proposal that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be a confederated State, and asked that he should be provided with further elements which he could put before his people. He did not negotiate. At the conclusion of the talks on 16 June, it was decided that all the participants should meet again on 23 June, after Mr. Karadzic and Mr. Boban had met to work out their ideas.

9. During their meetings with the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Co-Chairmen emphasized to them the need for all parties involved in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to engage in a constructive negotiation process, especially because of the deterioration in the situation on the ground politically and militarily and in humanitarian terms. Some members of the Presidency themselves emphasized that the situation could not be allowed to continue because of the suffering of the people on the ground.

II. CONFEDERATION PROPOSALS

10. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman informed the Co-Chairmen at their meeting on 23 June that consultations had taken place between Mr. Boban and Mr. Karadzic and that a draft providing for the organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a confederation of three constituent republics had been prepared. The constitutional principles already agreed upon as part of the Vance-Owen peace plan had been the basis for this document. The Co-Chairmen discussed the draft put forward and suggested additional elements designed to foster the cohesiveness and integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a State Member of the United Nations. These included:

(a) The establishment of a Confederated Council of Ministers whose Chairman would be Prime Minister, rotating at agreed intervals among the three Republics, with a similar rotation for the Foreign Minister;

(b) The referral of disputes that cannot be settled in the Constitutional Court by consensus for binding arbitration by a Chamber of five drawn from judges of the International Court of Justice;

(c) The international monitoring of throughways so as to ensure freedom of movement.

11. The Co-Chairmen felt that the draft principles were of sufficient importance to give them to the members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina for their information (see appendix I). The Co-Chairmen themselves took no position on this document, seeing their role as one of clarifying the issues. The Co-Chairmen then arranged for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet with Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman so that the two Presidents could explain their thinking. The meetings, throughout, had the character of an exchange of views.

12. Following the conclusion of the meeting between the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman, the Co-Chairmen had a further meeting with the Presidency. The Presidency met again in Zagreb on Friday, 25 June. It went to Brussels on Saturday, 26 June for meetings with the European Community troika and returned to Geneva for further discussions with the Co-Chairmen on Monday morning, 28 June. By then both President Izetbegovic and seven members of the Presidency had met with Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman and the European Community troika.

13. In the afternoon of 28 June the Co-Chairmen also had discussions with Mr. Boban and Mr. Karadzic. During those discussions, the two leaders largely reconfirmed their acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan's military agreement subject

to reference to the Mixed Military Working Group for updating and consequential amendment. They also agreed on texts that maintained key parts of the Vance-Owen agreement on interim arrangements, including arrangements for the protection of human rights (see appendices II and III). The texts were distributed to all members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including President Izetbegovic. The Co-Chairmen again did not take any position on these texts.

14. In the light of their discussions with the Co-Chairmen, all members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina met in Sarajevo on 29 June. They decided to appoint a group of three of their members to make policy suggestions for the Presidency in reacting to the proposals of the Serbs and the Croats mentioned above. The Presidency announced its intention to pursue this matter and indicated that it would wish to meet again with the Co-Chairmen.

III. MEETING OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

15. The Co-Chairmen convened a meeting of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on 1 July.

The Co-Chairmen stressed the following points:

(a) The deteriorating security situation facing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and humanitarian workers;

(b) The lack of resources for humanitarian operations;

(c) The lack of troops in UNPROFOR to fulfil the various mandates entrusted to it by the Security Council;

(d) The importance of continuing the search for negotiated solutions;

(e) The dangers of escalation of the conflict if the parties turn their backs on the search for negotiated solutions.

16. The Co-Chairmen circulated to the Steering Committee the revised constitutional principles, military agreements and interim arrangements put forward by the Serbs and Croats (see appendices I-III). During the meeting, they gave a detailed presentation on how, as a result of their clarification meetings, they thought a confederation of three Republics in Bosnia and Herzegovina might look in terms of territorial boundaries. They stressed that no specific map had been put forward but that the Serbs and Croats were offering to negotiate directly along the lines they had already explained to President Izetbegovic and the collective Presidency. The Co-Chairmen indicated what elements they had stressed on behalf of the Muslim people during their discussions on the Serb-Croat proposals:

(a) The importance of any republic with a predominantly Muslim population being given an equitable and economically viable share of territory, with guaranteed access to the Sava river and Adriatic Sea;

(b) The need to ensure road and rail access routes for Sarajevo;

(c) The need for contiguous territorial links for Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, the three "safe areas" in eastern Bosnia;

(d) The need to ensure that the Bihac area was of sufficient size to be viable and to have guaranteed road access to central Bosnia, and also out to Croatia;

(e) The importance of extending a republic with a predominantly Muslim population as far south as possible so as to make credible any guarantee of access to the Croatian port of Ploce.

IV. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

17. In Bosnia and Herzegovina not only is there currently widespread fighting but the humanitarian operations of international organizations are obstructed or sabotaged for military purposes, while the personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other organizations are increasingly targeted deliberately by members of the armed forces. While all of this is going on, the support of the international community for humanitarian operations is dwindling, with a wide gap between the needs of humanitarian operations and the sums actually received. There is therefore a serious challenge of role and of means affecting the United Nations and other organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18. The following facts vividly bring out the situation on the ground.

A. The humanitarian situation

19. UNHCR has funds for humanitarian operations for only a few more weeks. The winter of 1992-1993 was mild in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The chances are very high that the coming winter will be more severe, taking into account the usual kind of winter in the country. The problem facing UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations now is that they can hardly meet the needs of this summer, much less the needs of the coming winter. Since there is no sign of abatement of the conflict, it must be assumed that there will be a continued need for humanitarian relief in the winter. How to meet this need is difficult to foresee.

20. There is clear evidence of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian personnel. Aid convoys are deliberately blocked as part of the military strategies of all three sides. Humanitarian relief is diverted for military purposes. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations are unable to operate in some parts of the country.

B. The peace-keeping situation

21. The focus of the military conflict has shifted from a relatively localized Serbian-Muslim confrontation in the east to a wide-ranging Croat-Muslim confrontation in the centre. This phase of the conflict has disrupted UNHCR and

commercial traffic to the point where food has become scarce in the area. Refugee populations are swelling. Humanitarian agencies advise that many civilians, having exhausted their savings and food stocks over the last winter, are destitute.

22. In Bosnia and Herzegovina UNPROFOR has been given the tasks of protecting humanitarian convoys and deterring attacks against the safe areas. With the deployment of United Nations military observers to Gorazde, UNPROFOR has a presence in each of the safe areas that enables it to monitor the situation. However, the stark realities are that there is little prospect for implementing the safe areas policy before new resources arrive and that the civilian population will face devastating hardship next winter unless UNPROFOR focuses on efforts to restore utilities and humanitarian relief deliveries.

23. At the same time, there is concrete evidence that members of UNPROFOR are becoming the targets of deliberate attacks with a resulting rise in the casualty rates. UNPROFOR has now incurred 548 casualties, including 51 fatalities, in the former Yugoslavia. The casualty rate has significantly increased recently.

24. UNPROFOR's resources and equipment are badly strained. UNPROFOR has an urgent need for more troops and for armoured vehicles, medical evacuation capabilities, night vision and other surveillance equipment, signals equipment and communications equipment.

CONCLUSION

25. Members of the Security Council will wish to consider the deteriorating situation on the ground against the prospects for a negotiated settlement. While it is obviously of paramount importance to sustain the humanitarian effort for as long as possible, there is a real risk that, if the present downward spiral continues, it will be impossible for the United Nations to remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Appendix I

Constitutional principles for Bosnia and Herzegovina

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a confederation, the Constitution shall recognize three constituent peoples, as well as a group of others, with most governmental functions carried out by its Republics.

2. The Republics shall not enter into agreements with foreign States or with international organizations if it can damage the interests of other Republics.

3. Full freedom of movement shall be allowed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina to be ensured in part by the maintenance of internationally monitored throughways.

4. All matters of vital concern to any of the constituent peoples and their Republics shall be regulated in the Constitutions of the Republics and the tripartite constitutional agreement of confederation which, as to these points, may be amended only by consensus.

5. The Republics shall have democratically elected legislatures and democratically chosen chief executives and an independent judiciary. The Presidency of the confederation shall be composed of the three presidents of the Republics. There shall be a Confederal Council of Ministers composed of nine members, three from each of the Republics. The Chairman of the Confederal Council shall be Prime Minister. The Confederal Council shall include a Foreign Minister. The posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister shall rotate at agreed intervals among the three Republics. the Confederal Parliament shall be indirectly elected by the legislatures of the three Republics. The initial elections are to be United Nations/European Community/Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe supervised.

6. A Constitutional Court, with a member from each Republic, shall resolve disputes between the Republics and the Confederation, and among organs of the latter. In the event that the Constitutional Court cannot settle disputes by consensus, they shall be referred for binding arbitration by a Chamber of five drawn from judges of the International Court of Justice.

7. Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be progressively demilitarized under United Nations/European Community supervision.

8. The highest level of internationally recognized human rights shall be provided for in the Constitution, which shall also provide for ensuring implementation through both domestic and international mechanisms.

9. A number of international monitoring devices shall be provided for in the Constitution, to remain in place at least until the three Republics by consensus agree to dispense with them.

Appendix II

Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Provided that there is agreement on the constitutional principles and on a new map of the boundaries of the republics within Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb and Croat sides accept the document "Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina", subject to reference to the Mixed Military Working Group for updating and any consequential amendments, for example in relation to the agreed map.

Appendix III

Interim arrangements

A. Coordination Body

A Coordination Body for the implementation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter the Coordination Body) will be established to do its utmost to bring the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end and to work for reconstruction and full respect for human rights within the framework of the Vance-Owen peace process and the continuing work of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

The Coordination Body shall be composed of nine members, three each to be appointed from time to time by the parties representing respectively the Muslim, the Serb and the Croat peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Coordination Body shall take its decisions by a consensus of nine, or by a qualified majority of seven, or by a simple majority of five, depending on whether the decision relates to a constitutional principle, to a specially important question or to normal business of the Coordination Body. The precise mechanism is to be laid down in the rules of procedure, which will be adopted by consensus.

The Coordination Body shall be chaired by the Co-Chairmen until the start of the interim period. The Coordination Body shall at the start of the interim period elect from its number three Presidents, who shall hold the chairmanship of the Coordination Body on a monthly basis, during which time they shall exercise the functions of Head of the Confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Coordination Body shall elect a person to be Foreign Minister and this post will rotate every four months. The Foreign Minister shall be answerable to the Coordination Body.

B. Boundary Commission

A Boundary Commission shall be set up by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Co-Chairmen. The Commission shall receive and, if necessary, hear evidence from those affected by the proposed provisional boundaries of the Republics and advise on the demarcation of the Republics to be specified in the new Constitution. The Commission shall consist of five persons: one each to be recommended by the three parties and two, one of whom shall be the Chairman, to be recommended by the Co-Chairmen. The Commission shall use as its basic document the provisional map of the Republics. It shall be empowered to consider only marginal changes to the provisional boundaries. The decisions of the Commission shall be adopted by consensus. Any disagreements shall be referred to the Coordination Body.

C. International borders

International border crossing-points are to be the responsibility of the Republics; initially, until the new Constitution comes into effect, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 838 (1993), international observers shall be deployed to monitor effectively the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.* Monitors shall be drawn from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations. Customs and excise arrangements shall be the responsibility of the Republics. The Coordination Body will establish the quota for funding the confederal budget.

D. Police forces

All uniformed police shall be controlled by the Republics and shall reflect the proportions of the constituent peoples in the respective Republics. Any necessary coordination shall be the responsibility of the Coordination Body.

E. Protection of human rights and the reversal of ethnic cleansing

1. During the interim period, all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be entitled to all rights provided for in the existing Constitution and in applicable legislation in force, as well as to all rights provided for in specified international instruments on human rights (set out in document S/24795, annex VII, appendix). To the extent that there are any discrepancies, the provision providing the greater protection of human rights shall be applied. All statements or commitments made under duress, particularly those relating to the relinquishment of rights to land or property, shall be treated as wholly null and void.

2. The implementation of the above-mentioned human rights shall be ensured through:

(a) The courts of the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to which all persons shall have unimpeded access;

(b) An Interim Human Rights Court for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be established immediately along the lines of that proposed by the Co-Chairmen for inclusion in the new Constitution; a/

(c) The immediate appointment of four ombudsmen, supported by adequate staff and facilities. b/

3. In addition, there shall be an International Human Rights Monitoring Mission, to be established by the Secretary-General and to be headed by an Interim Human Rights Commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be based in Sarajevo. Deputy Commissioners are to be based in various parts of the country.

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* The Serbs have entered a reservation on international observers.

The Commissioner is to be supported by international human rights monitors, deployed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; in order to provide protection in urgent cases, they shall be allowed to intercede with the Coordination Body and the governments of the Republics and, with UNPROFOR; they may refer issues to the ombudsmen and to other human rights agencies as needed and are to work closely with UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian agencies. The Commissioner is expected to submit regular reports to the Secretary-General, who is to report periodically to the Security Council and to other international bodies, including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Special Rapporteur.

4. The Coordination Body and the governments of the Republics shall be required to make certain that all authorities give the fullest access, in respect of all relevant persons and places, to the Interim Human Rights Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners and the human rights monitors, as well as to UNHCR, ICRC and other international humanitarian organizations.

5. It is understood that as part of the UNPROFOR deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina there will be a large civilian police element, whose principal task would be to monitor the police of the Republics so that each: has an appropriately balanced ethnic composition (see sect. D above); does not oppress members of minority ethnic groups; contributes positively to the reversal of "ethnic cleansing" by protecting persons returning after having been forced to flee; carries out the judgements of courts, in particular the Human Rights Court (see sect. E.2 (b) above); and assists the Interim Human Rights Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners and the human rights monitors (see sect. E.3 above). All of these monitors would be responsible to the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative.

F. International access authority

1. Principle 3 of the agreed constitutional principles states that "full freedom of movement shall be allowed throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be ensured in part by the maintenance of internationally controlled throughways". In order to implement this principle, the Coordination Body shall establish an International Access Authority:

(a) To have sole responsibility for all railway lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina that traverse more than one Republic;

(b) To have responsibility, in cooperation with UNPROFOR, for those roads which are declared to be internationally controlled throughways;

(c) To regulate, where necessary, the operation of port facilities on the River Sava.

2. The essential purpose of the International Access Authority will be to guarantee full freedom of movement between and within the Republics and also to and from the Republics to the Republic of Croatia and to the Republic of Serbia. It is intended that the Authority be in operation as soon as possible during the interim period. Following the conclusion of the peace package, all designated throughways shall come under the responsibility of UNPROFOR; thereafter there

will be a period of overlapping responsibility of UNPROFOR and the Authority, during which UNPROFOR's involvement will be phased out and its responsibilities assumed by traffic police employed by the Authority. This transfer of responsibility requires the agreement of all members of the Authority.

3. The Coordination Body shall appoint the Interim Access Authority.

4. The Authority shall have its headquarters in Sarajevo.

Notes

a/ See S/24795, annex VII, sect.VI.B.3.

b/ Ibid., sect. VI.B.2.

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12 July 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JULY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the text (in English and Russian) of a statement by the Heads of State or Government of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which participated in the Second Summit Meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which was held in Istanbul, on 6-7 July 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

120793

Annex

[Original: English/Russian]

STATEMENT BY THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE SECOND ECO SUMMIT MEETING (ISTANBUL 6-7 JULY 1993)

During the Summit in Istanbul, participating States condemned the continuation of the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijani territories and the escalation and widening of hostilities towards Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrail, Kubatli and Agdere.

Aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan is in contravention with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, international law, Human Rights Convention and the CSCE Documents.

This most recent attack is taking place at a time when all concerned have approved a timetable within the Minsk peace process encompassing urgent steps for the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 822. It is now an established pattern for the Armenians to resume and escalate hostilities each time when a positive step is taken within the peace process, thus creating serious doubts about their desire to reach a negotiated solution.

Reaffirming the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force and non-use of force for gaining political advantages, the participating States call upon the international community to use its influence with Armenia to put an end to this aggression.

Member States participating in the Second ECO Summit held in Istanbul demand an immediate cessation of all hostilities and withdrawal of Armenian armed formations from all the occupied Azerbaijani territories and adherence to the timetable of urgent steps for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 822.

The participating States call upon Armenia to change its aggressive attitude and adopt a peaceful policy conducive to the establishment of stability and peace in the region.

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 26 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Michael Aron has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 9 July 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Dr. Carolyn Browne has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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